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AbstrAct: A sample of 152 accidents and incidents 
involving Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, more commonly 
referred to as “drones”, have been analysed. The data was 
collected from a 10-year period, 2006 to 2015, conveniently 
sourced from a limited population owing to the scarcity of 
reports. Results indicate that safety occurrences involving 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have a significantly 
different distribution of contributing factors when sorted into 
distinct categories. This provides a thorough and up-to-date 
characterization of the safety deficiencies specific to RPAS. In 
turn, this contributes to the development of adequate safety 
management systems applicable to the RPAS sector. The 
majority of RPAS occurrences involved system component 
failures which were the result of equipment problems. 
Therefore, airworthiness instead of pilot licensing needs to be 
considered first when regulating the Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
System industry. “Human factors” and “loss of control in-flight” 
were found to be the second most common “contributing 
factor” and “occurrence category”, respectively; Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft pilot licensing will help reduce the probability 
of these secondary occurrences. The most significant 
conclusion is that reporting systems must be implemented 
to address RPAS accidents and incidents specifically, such 
that more useful data is available, and further analysis is 
possible facilitating an improved understanding and greater 
awareness.
Keywords: RPAS, UAS, UAV, Accidents and incidents, 
Aviation safety.
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IntroductIon
There is a growing interest in aircraft that are controlled 
from a remote location without a pilot located in the aircraft 
itself. Referred to by many terms (“drones”, UAV, UAS, etc.) 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO 2015) 
has recently adopted “Remotely Piloted Aircraft System” 
(RPAS) to identify these aircraft. The absence of a flight crew 
on-board the aircraft creates unique challenges in terms of 
the safety risks associated with the operation of RPAS. That is, 
the dimensions and applicability of the well-known Software, 
Hardware, Environment, Liveware, and Liveware (SHELL) 
model adopted by ICAO Circular 216-AN31 (ICAO 1989) 
will be significantly different from those associated with the 
operation of conventionally-piloted aircraft. In particular, 
the interrelationships between the elements constituting the 
framework of the SHELL model will be significantly different.
These unmanned aircraft, commonly referred to as “drones” 
in the defence sector, usually conjure up thoughts of Predator 
UCAVs firing Hellfire missiles in combat operations (Callam 
2015). In the civil sector, the presence of RPAS is still a relatively 
new phenomenon (ICAO 2011; Skrzypietz 2012). From the 
1990s, civil operation of RPAS was mostly seen in the Japanese 
agriculture industry (MarketLine 2014; Odido and Madara 
2013). The ever-evolving nature of the aviation industry has 
supported a vast deviation of RPAS into civilian aviation. 
These areas include policing activities, wildlife and fisheries 
protection, environmental monitoring, surveillance, as well as 
search and rescue (Gupta et al. 2013). The aviation industry 
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recognises the economic benefits of remotely piloted aircraft and 
acknowledges the many opportunities provided by their use in 
“dull, dirty, dangerous and demanding” tasks, that may otherwise 
impose high risk to a piloted aircraft (CASA date unknown, b).
The examination of past accident and incident cases 
can assist in the continuous improvement of safety, such 
that potential hazards, unsafe acts, and latent conditions are 
identified before they have disastrous effects (ICAO 2013). 
This vital data can lead to more informed decision-making by 
regulatory bodies around corrective actions moving forward 
and the allocation of resources (ICAO 2007). It also allows 
for the communication and dissemination of valuable safety 
information, which is key in fostering a positive safety culture in 
the industry (ICAO 2013). The definition of accident and incident 
adopted by ICAO will be used in the context of this paper. For 
simplicity, throughout this paper, the term “occurrence” will 
be used when referring to both accident and incident events. 
It is hoped that this research will assist in the reduction of 
accidents and incidents in the civil RPAS sector by analysing past 
occurrences and identifying common contributing factors. To 
this end, a sample of 152 civil RPAS accidents and incidents was 
analysed. The data set spanned a 10-year period, from 2006 to 
2015. The data was sourced from multiple online databases and 
was then classified by type of occurrence, occurrence category, 
contributing factors, phase of flight, and time of flight. The 
primary research question posed in this paper is “what are 
the common factors in RPAS accidents and incidents in civil 
aviation between 2006 and 2015?”.
LIterature revIew
Accidents and incidents are an unfortunate element of all 
sectors of the aviation industry, with the RPAS sector being 
no exception (Clothier and Walker 2015; ICAO 2013). The 
complexity of the systems and the many external influences 
on them mean that aiming for zero accidents is unrealistic. 
A more achievable approach to safety for operators and 
regulators is to focus on managing the potential hazards 
and risks associated with their operation to a level as low 
as reasonably possible (Clothier and Walker 2015; Xunguo 
et al. 2014). As supported by ICAO (2013) in their Safety 
Management Manual, it is clear that the collection of accident 
and incident data is a key step in the identification of potential 
hazards and risk areas.
The necessity of this research is exacerbated by the intense 
growth of the RPAS sector in recent years. Valavanis and 
Vachtsevanos (2015) attribute this growth to the steps taken by 
regulatory bodies such as the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the European Commission to outline Civilian RPAS 
roadmaps. With the use of RPAS becoming more diverse and 
its development fast-tracked with lowering costs, there is a real 
need to remain proactive, ensuring the overwhelming benefits 
are not overshadowed by the potential risk to safety (AIA date 
unknown; Harrison 2013; Valavanis and Vachtsevanos 2015). 
sAfety trend
With air travel commonly referred to as the safest form 
of travel, statistics published by Allianz (2014) show that the 
aviation sector’s safety level has consistently increased over 
the decades with accident rates in recent years at their lowest. 
This positive safety trend has been attributed to advancements 
of technology and the process of continuous improvement 
adopted by the industry, which includes the study of accident 
and incident causation (Allianz 2014). 
However, Allianz (2014) also highlights the very real risk 
that technological advancements such as RPAS may have on 
this safety position, with a report undertaken by the Joint 
Authorities for Rule-Making on Unmanned Systems (JARUS 
WG-6 2014) supporting this. RPAS operations are set to 
increase substantially in the future and focus on operations in 
non-segregated airspace, a requirement for the sector’s future 
viability (AIA date unknown; European Commission 2014). 
As such, it is important that accidents and incidents involving 
these systems are mitigated before they eventuate — a sentiment 
supported by Clarke and Bennett Moses (2014). 
Whilst it is not the aim of this research to determine if 
unmanned aircraft are, or are not, safer than manned aircraft; 
it is important to acknowledge the literature on both sides. 
AIA (date unknown) and Skrzypietz (2012) take the point-of-
view that RPAS may in fact offer increased operational safety 
over conventional manned aircraft through “sense and avoid” 
technologies. Those studies suggest that the risks are lower 
given the removal of the human element in the cockpit. In 
contrast, Clarke and Bennett Moses (2014) suggest that the 
remoteness of the pilot in these systems may lead to a greater 
lack of situational awareness, and hence an increased safety 
risk. What this literature highlights is that more research needs 
to be undertaken on the impact of RPAS operations in civil 
environments.
J. Aerosp. Technol. Manag., São José dos Campos, Vol.9, No 2, pp.157-168, Apr.-Jun., 2017
159
A Post-Accident Analysis of Civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft System Accidents and Incidents
the ImportAnce of IdentIfyIng common 
fActors
There has been extensive research highlighting the potential 
of the emerging RPAS sector and the challenges it brings in the 
safety arena. The industry and regulatory bodies are working 
to address these many challenges (AIA date unknown). As 
previously discussed, the exploration of common factors 
in previous occurrences is a key input for helping to identify 
and influence relevant regulatory decisions and processes 
(ICAO 2013).
Previous research undertaken within different aviation 
environments has previously been conducted and highlights the 
effectiveness of this reactive method. Australia’s Bureau of Air 
Safety Investigation (BASI 1996) completed a study into fatal 
accidents in the general aviation (GA) sector. Issues surrounding 
human factors were found to contribute to approximately 
70 – 80% of accidents in this sector. A later report by Australia’s 
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA date unknown, a) into 
common factors in Australian GA accidents was able to reveal 
information including that:
•	 The high number of fatal accidents in the private 
flight category. 
•	 Key factors in accidents of inadequate flight planning 
and aircraft handling.
•	 Of the flight planning management category, 17% 
could be attributed to unnecessary low-level flying.
The CASA’s research was undertaken with a similar view to 
this present study, in that it will enable further detailed analysis 
to take place in the future (CASA date unknown, a). In 2010, 
further analysis took place addressing key CASA findings of 
GA accidents in the private flight category. Undertaken by the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB 2010), the report 
analysed this type of occurrence in more detail and was able 
to provide key safety information.
Research completed by Clothier and Walker (2015) used 
sample data from Tvaryanas et al. (2006). This study of military 
RPAS accidents and common failure categories identified 
common human factor elements as a cause for 60.2% of the 
221 cases studied. This information allows risks to be identified 
with the aim of mitigating them before they eventuate (Clothier 
and Walker 2015; ICAO 2007, 2013). This study was significant 
as it represented the first post-accident analysis of a relatively 
large sample of RPAS accidents for the defence sector.
The relevance of post-accident, explorative research can 
also be witnessed in a recent report by Boyd (2015), who 
investigated the “causes and risk factors for fatal accidents in 
non-commercial twin engine piston general aviation aircraft”. 
Having similar motives to the research herein, Boyd’s report 
highlights the valuable information that can be attained through 
a post-accident review, and identified a potential deficiency in 
key training areas. Armed with this vital knowledge, regulatory 
bodies were able to make informed decisions, in Boyd’s case 
about the multi-engine rating training syllabus. Safety bulletins 
were then disseminated and flight schools could review their 
training methods. Without post-accident analysis, vital statistics 
would not have been discovered, including that 70 – 80% 
of accidents are related to human elements (Clothier and 
Walker 2015), or that 53% of GA accidents during 1999 – 2000 
correspond to private flight (CASA date unknown, a). Hence 
valuable safety information and regulations may not have been 
created or amended.
AccIdent And IncIdent reportIng
The rules and regulations governing aviation activities are “as 
fundamental and rudimentary to the aviation industry as civil 
order is to modern society” (Bartsch 2015). Australia became 
one of the first countries to regulate the operation of RPAS in 
civil airspace with the introduction in 2002 of rules specifically 
for unmanned aerial activities, (CASA date unknown). Since 
then, significant progress has been made in the promulgation 
of rules for RPAS operations with the FAA in the USA putting 
into place policies in 2007 allowing the integration of RPAS into 
non-segregated airspace (FAA 2013). Work has continued to 
progress in Europe to assure harmonisation of regulations across 
the continents (European RPAS Steering Group 2013). ICAO 
is in the process of developing standards and recommended 
practices (SARPs) for RPAS operations and the RPAS Manual 
(RPASM) was published in 2015 to provide guidance for 
contracting States on RPAS integration into non-segregated 
airspace (Bartsch 2015).
Whilst all rules and regulations are important to guide this 
sector, the focus for this research is only on the importance of 
regulations pertaining to the reporting of RPAS accidents and 
incidents. Issues surrounding the existence of RPAS accident 
and incident reporting systems have been discussed recently 
by both Enomoto et al. (2013) and Clothier and Walker (2015). 
Both studies identified issues with the ability to collect valid 
accident and incident information due to inaccessibility, 
inconsistencies, and gaps in data, a limitation that is also noted in 
this current paper.
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The opposite is apparent in the military RPAS sector where 
data is more publically accessible (Clothier and Walker 2015), 
therefore, studies of military occurrences have been more 
prominent. Enomoto et al. (2013) identified in their study a 
number of publicly available sources that contained or had the 
potential to capture civil RPAS occurrences, however these 
existed only in the US, Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada.
Voluntary reporting systems, such as the United States FAA 
Near Mid-Air Collision System (NMACS), exist as a means to 
encourage aviators to submit reports. Whilst the importance of 
these reporting systems are recognised, it has been suggested 
that not having controls or regulations for RPAS occurrence 
reporting facilitates the distortion of data (Goglia 2014). 
This then suggests that the subjectiveness of suspected RPAS 
occurrences can in fact degrade the ability to draw on these 
databases as a source of truth in implementing safety actions/
recommendations. Instead of playing a role in the output of 
safety recommendations and regulations as is intended with 
these regulatory accident and incident databases, Goglia (2014) 
argues that they just allow for the collection of unsubstantiated 
claims of a “growing problem with small drones”.
Regardless of whether the systems available are mandatory 
or voluntary, a key issue is the lack of consistency across ICAO 
member states and within the respective databases. Having 
appropriate regulations in place to address the type and quantity 
of data to be collected will no doubt assist as a first step. The 
approach taken by ICAO, the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), and other organisations to harmonise 
their safety data reporting would also help in the comparison 
of safety data regarding accidents and incidents in RPAS.
MethodoLogy
desIgn
This study followed a mixed-method approach, specifically 
an exploratory design, in which the first phase saw the 
implementation of content analysis, a qualitative method. 
This was utilised in order to systematically select and examine 
information within relevant accident and incident case studies 
and then to identify common trends and themes (Leedy and 
Ormrod 2013). The cases were selected through convenience 
sampling. That is, no random sub-sampling was conducted 
and all of the cases found were included. Following this, the 
categorised data was then quantified and analysed to uncover 
common causal factors to determine if any statistical significance 
existed. That is, the second phase (the quantitative phase) of 
the mixed method was a causal-comparative study.
dAtA collectIon
The 152 cases analysed and discussed in this paper were 
collected from a number of publically available accident 
investigation databases, safety reporting systems, and through a 
general website search.  These included, but were not limited to:
•	 FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
System.
•	 NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System.
•	 Civil Aviation Authority.
The data collected focussed specifically on RPAS accidents 
and incidents whilst under civil operation only, between the 
years 2006 to 2015.
A number of reports were found (35 in total) through 
the data collection stage that identified airspace incursions 
or separation incidents involving RPAS. These reports were 
made to accident investigation bodies by numerous sources 
such as commercial airline pilots and air traffic controllers. 
Unfortunately these cases did not have conclusive evidence of 
RPAS involvement and the RPAS operator was not able to be 
identified. For this reason they have been excluded from the 
scope of this study. Instead, this research has only focused on 
the common “occurrence categories” and “contributing factors” 
that lead to RPAS incidents or accidents so that the frequency 
and type of these occurrences may be better understood and 
mitigated in future.
dAtA clAssIfIcAtIon
Specific fields (variables) were identified and the cases were 
entered against these. These fields were selected and this method 
of collection was chosen after a review of previous research 
papers that performed similar activities in other aviation sectors. 
In particular, the annual Statistical Summary of Commercial 
Jet Airplane Accidents publication completed by Boeing was 
pivotal to inform the post accident analysis methodology. The 
ATSB Aviation Accident or Incident Notication form also 
provided relevant classifications for collection. The importance 
and relevance of selecting key categories in accident analysis 
was identifed by Boeing (2013), which suggested that the 
approach provides greater insight for the risk management 
and continuous improvement processes. As such, the ICAO 
Aviation Occurrence Categories were used to code the cases. 
A slight revision to these categories was made in this paper in 
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order to simplify the collection. The System Component Failure/
Malfunction (SCF) categories under ICAO’s standards are 
separated into 2 subcategories — SCF non powerplant events 
and SCF powerplant events. This study has simply combined 
the 2 and considers all SCF events together. The Occurrence 
Categories (OC) used in the coding were:
•	 System Component Failure (SCF).
•	 Loss of Control – Inflight (LOC-I).
•	 Navigation Error (NAV).
•	 Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC).
•	 Collision with obstacle(s) during takeoff and landing 
(CTOL).
•	 Air Traffic Management/Communication Navigation 
Survellence (ATM).
•	 Midair/Near Midair Collision (MAC).
•	 Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
•	 Loss of Control – Ground (LOC-G).
•	 Turbulence (TURB).
•	 Unknown (UNK).
The second field identified was the Factors Contributing to 
Occurrence. The Contributing Factors (CF) were coded into 
specific elements in order to ensure a consistent approach. 
These elements were:
•	 Equipment Problems (EP).
•	 Human Factors (HF).
•	 Organisational Issues (OI).
•	 Environmental Issues (EI).
•	 Unknown (UNK).
These elements were adopted through review of other similar 
studies such as Pagán et al. (2006) and Boyd (2015). Additionally, 
research by Johnson and Holloway (2007) was drawn on to 
classify the high level contributing factors.
The phase of flight was also an important field identified. 
The Phases of Flight (PoF) used to code the cases investigated 
in this study included:
•	 Takeoff and climb out.
•	 Cruise or en-route.
•	 Descent, approach, and landing.
•	 Unknown.
It should be noted that other typical phases of flight exist, which 
have been omitted from this study. This is justifiable as there 
were no RPAS occurrences in these categories.
The final 2 fields coded were time of occurrence (ToO) and 
the occurrence type (OT). The ToO was coded as either night 
or day. The OT was coded as either an accident or an incident.
AnAlysIs
Once all 152 cases had been collated and classified, common 
trends were identified and frequencies of occurrences were 
noted (Leedy and Ormrod 2013). The first stage of this was 
to visually inspect data in charts to assist in the uncovering 
of significant information such as the primary CF and OC 
as well as the frequency of these cases. In order to determine 
statistical significance of this categorical data, Pearson’s χ2 test 
of independence was performed (Berman and Wang 2011). The 
test was employed when comparing data such as OC by type of 
occurrence and importantly when looking at the significance 
of OCs and contributing factors under different conditions 
such as PoF and ToO conditions (Boyd 2015; Pagán et al. 2006).
The quantitative data analysis involved Pearson’s χ2 tests for 
independence. The statistical hypotheses are given as:
where: subscripts i and j represent the 2 fields being compared 
(in this paper these are 2 of OC, CF, PoF, ToO, or OT); p is in 
reference to the proportions of the n-th category (there are 4 for 
OC, 4 for CF, 3 for PoF, 2 for ToO, and 2 for OT). H0 is the null 
hypothesis and can therefore be expressed as: “the proportions of 
field i cases are equal for the proportions for field j cases”. HA is the 
alternative hypothesis, and, in contrast to this, “the proportions 
are not equal”. The χ2 is given by Berman and Wang (2011):
HA: pi,n ≠ pj,n
(1)
(2)
H0: pi,n = pj,n
where: there are n classifications for field i, and m classifications 
for field j. 
The number of degrees of freedom, df, is given as (n – 1)
(m – 1) for each test. The critical value was then determined 
from the degrees of freedom using the χ2 table, with a 95% 
confidence level. Finally, if χ2 was less than the critical value 
H0 was accepted, otherwise, H0 was rejected. 
resuLts
clAssIfIcAtIons
In total, 152 cases involving RPAS accidents or incidents 
were collected that occurred in the 10-year period from 2006 to 
2015. The breakdown of cases coded in terms of OC is shown 
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in Fig. 1a. Across the cases, the most common OCs were found 
to be SCFs at 63% and LOC-I at 14%. 
Figure 1b shows the breakdown of cases coded by the CF. 
EPs have the highest percentage, at 41%, while HFs are the 
second most common at 15%. These numbers, however, are 
skewed by the large number of UNK events (35%). Hence, if 
these are excluded there are 64% EPs, and 23% HFs.
The breakdown of cases coded by PoF is shown in Fig. 1c. 
Once again a relatively large number of reported cases did 
not include information about which PoF the occurrence 
happened. Excluding these UNK cases it is noted that 45% of 
cases occurred in cruise, 30% of cases occurred at takeoff, and 
25% of cases occurred during landing.
Figure 1d shows the breakdown of cases coded by ToO. 
Note the majority of case reports did not indicate the time 
when the occurrence happened. The percentage of cases that 
occurred during the day was 70% while the percentage of cases 
that occurred at night was 30%, excluding the UNK cases.
Finally, the OT was quantified. As every occurrence 
could be classified as either an incident or an accident there 
were no UNK cases. The breakdown is shown in Fig. 1e. 
The incidents account for 74% of all cases while accidents 
account for 26%.
compArIson
Following the initial quantification of the coded data, 
the various fields were compared and contrasted in terms 
of their percentage distribution. Figure 2a shows the OCs 
percentage proportions for each of the other fields. Figure 1a 
shows that a large number of categories contain a relatively 
small number of cases; as such, these categories were grouped 
into an “other” category. This would not influence the nature 
of the proportional distribution. Visually the proportions 
for the OCs appear to be different for every field. Of note is 
that the majority of EPs correspond to SCFs. Next, the OIs 
are split between NAV and “other”. Finally, for EIs there are a 
large number of “other” cases which includes environmental 
related occurrences such as TURB, WILD etc. For PoF relative 
to OT shows a large number of “other” for landing, which 
includes ARC, CTOL, etc. For ToO, there is a large number of 
NAV cases at night. For the OT, the inference is that a larger 
proportion of incidents involve SCFs, and a larger proportion 
of accidents involve NAV.
Next the CF was compared and contrasted to the remaining 
fields. For PoF, it can be seen in Fig. 2b that HFs are more 
common for landing, while EPs are more common for takeoff, 
and cruise cases show the most OIs, with no EIs. 
Figure 1. Pareto plot showing number of cases (2006-2015).
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year period (2006 – 2015). Note: UNK cases have been 
excluded.
AnAlysIs
To confirm the visual comparison from Fig. 2a to Fig. 2d, 
the Pearson χ2 test for independence between each of the fields 
was undertaken. In total, there are 10 ways the 5 fields can be 
paired. These are all summarised in Table 1, in the top 2 rows. 
The table also shows the corresponding χ2 test statistics, the 
degrees of freedom, the critical value, the p-value (the probability 
for the given test statistic with the stated degrees of freedom), 
and the conclusion. OCs and CF are discussed in detail below. 
At this point it is noted that the proportions of PoF between 
ToO is not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.59, a = 0.05, df = 2). 
That is, PoF cases are not more or less likely to occur because of 
the ToO. In fact, it may have been plausible to hypothesise that 
night operations would result in more occurrences during 
takeoff and landing, which is not supported by the findings. 
Similarly, the proportions for PoF between OT is not statistically 
significant (χ2 = 4.44, a = 0.05, df = 2). That is, PoF does not 
result in a greater or lesser proportion of accidents relative to 
incidents. There does appear to be a larger proportion of accidents 
during takeoff and landing, but the limited sample size means 
this conclusion is not statistically significant. Finally, of ToO and 
OT showed no statistical significance (χ2 = 0.00, a = 0.05, df = 1), 
as highlighted in the “Comparison” section.
Occurrence Category
A statistical significance was found between the OCs and the 
CFs (χ2 = 75.7, a = 0.05, df = 9), that is, at the 95% confidence 
level the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there 
is a difference in the distribution between CFs for different OCs. 
More directly, it is fair to state that CFs influence specific 
OCs in different ways. It can then be concluded that:
•	 EPs contribute the most to SCF. 
•	 HFs are more significant for LOC-I cases. 
•	 OIs are associated with “other” and NAV cases. 
•	 EIs are more common for “other” (TURB and WILD 
etc.) cases.
A statistical significance was also found between the OC 
and PoF (χ2 = 15.1, a = 0.05, df = 6). So, at the 95% confidence 
level, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that 
there is a difference in the distribution between PoF for different 
OCs. That is, OC occur at different rates in the different PoF. 
Based on the proportions it can be concluded that:
•	 Cruise has a larger proportion of SCF. 
•	 Takeoff has the largest portion of LOC-I cases. 
•	 Landing has the most “other” (ARC, CTOL etc.) cases.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 2c compares and contrasts PoF to ToO and OT. 
These show relatively similar proportions. This is important 
to consider as the data suggests that night time occurrences 
happen in cruise and not during takeoff or landing as one 
may hypothesise. When looking at the OT cases that are 
accidents they occur more frequently during takeoff and 
landing.
Finally, the comparison between ToO and OT is shown in 
Fig. 2d. The proportions are identical. It is worth noting that 
there is no specific reason why this would not be the case, and 
helps to suggest the random nature of the sample. It might be 
conceivable, however, to hypothesise that accidents at night 
would be more common.
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A statistical significance was also found between the 
OCs and ToO (χ2 = 10.8, a = 0.05, df = 3). So, at the 95% 
confidence level, the null hypothesis is rejected and it 
is concluded that there is a difference in the distribution of 
the ToO between the types of OC. That is, OCs have different 
rates during the day and night. Based on the proportions it 
can be concluded that:
•	 Day-time cases have a larger proportion of SCF.
•	 Night-time cases have a significantly larger proportion 
of NAV cases.
A statistical significance was also found between the OC and 
OT (χ2 = 18.8, a = 0.05, df = 3). So, at the 95% confidence level, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there is 
a difference in the distribution between OT for the different 
OCs. That is, the end result (an incident or an accident) varies 
based on the OCs. It can then be concluded that:
•	 A larger proportion of incidents are associated with 
SCFs.
•	 A relatively larger proportion of accidents result from 
LOC-I.
Contributing Factor
A statistical significance was found between the CF and PoF 
(χ2 = 19.0, a = 0.05, df = 6). So, at the 95% confidence level, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there is 
a difference in the distribution between PoF across the CFs. 
That is, CFs are involved at different rates in the different PoF. 
Based on the proportions it can be concluded that:
•	 Cruise has the largest proportion of OIs and no recorded 
EIs. 
•	 Takeoff has the largest proportion of EPs and the 
smallest portion HFs. 
•	 Landing has the largest proportion of HFs contributions 
and no OIs.
A breakdown of CFs across OT showed no statistical 
significance (χ2 = 5.50, a = 0.05, df = 3). Hence, it can be 
assumed that the CFs are similar for cases if they are coded 
as accidents or incidents. Similarly the division of CFs by 
ToO showed no statistical significance (χ2 = 6.98, a = 0.05, 
df = 3). However, this results in a p-value of 0.07, which is 
more than 90% significant. The most likely type of error 
associated with a χ2 test is a Type II Error (accepting H0 
when it should be rejected). As such, the division of CFs by 
ToO should be considered borderline. Therefore it is worth 
noting the potential that OIs contribute to the majority of 
night-time cases.
dIscussIon
fIndIngs
The data collected revealed that 61% of all occurrences 
were attributed to SCFs, with a significant gap between the 
next closest OC factor, LOC-I. A report by the ATSB on the 
accidents and incidents in an Australian aviation context over 
the period 2003 to 2012 showed markedly different results 
than those found in the civil RPAS sector. The ATSB report 
revealed that for the Australian GA and Air Transport sectors, 
NAV and wildlife (WILD) occurrences dominated (ATSB 
2013). Seemingly the RPAS sector most resembles that of 
the Recreational Aviation (RA) sector in terms of occurrence 
categories. One reason behind this similarity could be the 
less restrictive certification standards required in these 2 
sectors in terms of airworthiness and design (Brandon 2014; 
Johnson 2010).  
Whilst it is recognised that a zero occurrence rate is not 
realistic and that there are no preferable OCs, the high frequency 
of SCF occurrences certainly highlights an area that deserves 
further detailed research. It is disconcerting to find that 
field  1 category factor pof time
field 2 factor pof time type pof time type time type type
c2 75.7 15.1 10.8 18.8 19.02 6.98 5.5 1.59 4.44 0
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
df 9 6 3 3 6 3 3 2 2 1
Critical 16.92 12.59 7.81 7.81 12.59 7.81 7.81 5.99 5.99 3.84
p-value 1E-12 0.020 0.013 0.0003 0.004 0.07 0.139 0.45 0.11 1
Conclusion Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept
table 1. Pearson’s χ2 test for independence comparing pairs of fields.
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when disregarding the UNK category, 93% of SCF cases were 
contributed to by EPs.  These included loss of data link, software 
malfunctions and flight control issues to name a few. Examples 
of these issues identified in cases collected include:
•	 Case Reference No 34a “Engine mount failure resulting 
in propeller damage on landing”.
•	 Case Reference No 34g “Iridium C2 modem failure. 
(One of 4 modems)”.
•	 Case Reference No 34u “Anomalous Embedded GPS/
Inertial Navigation System (EGI) GPS degradation”.
The types of accidents and incidents that occur in RPAS 
operations have been influenced by the greater reliance on and 
complexity of (Gupta et al. 2013; Hobbs and Herwitz 2006):
•	 Communication links.
•	 Navigation hardware.
•	 Software.
The same can also be said for the CFs identified in these 
accidents and incidents. This study has revealed that although 
HFs have been widely attributed to over 2/3 of aviation 
accidents and incidents (BASI 1996; Clothier and Walker 
2015; Skrzypietz 2012), the same cannot be said regarding 
the civil RPAS sector. Instead, equipment failures (41%) have 
appeared to be more of a primary instigator in occurrences. 
This is clearly in contrast to other sectors. Interestingly, 
despite clear differences between the civil and military RPAS 
sectors, failure of aircraft components (66%) also had more 
of a significance over that of human error (34%) within the 
military as well (Williams 2004).
It appears suggestions by the AIA (date unknown) and also 
Skrzypietz (2012), that the removal of the on-board pilot in 
these systems should result in a reduced risk, maybe supported 
by the results in this study. It is unknown whether EPs based 
SCFs and LOC-I occurrences are due to design flaws or if system 
maintenance is to blame, which could be HF and OI induced. 
Hobbs and Herwitz (2006) suggest that the level of knowledge 
and experience of RPAS maintenance personnel may not be 
at the level required due to the complexity and diversity of the 
systems and the infancy of the sector, potentially contributing 
to the problem. 
Reviewing cases in more detail revealed a statistical 
significance between the PoF and CFs, with EPs more prevalent 
in cruise whilst the landing phase saw HFs dominate. Further 
research needs to be undertaken in order to determine the main 
types of EPs experienced in these cases; however, initial review 
indicates that just under a third involved “lost link” issues. The 
prevalence of these types of failures may be rationalised by types 
of communication links utilised in different phases (Kaliardos 
and Lyall 2015). During critical phases such as takeoff and 
landing, line of sight links resulting in less latency and reduced 
impact of degradation are used; whereas phases such as cruise 
that require less manoeuvrability often rely on satellite based 
control links which are more susceptible to degradation given 
the increased latency (Kaliardos and Lyall 2015). 
It was not surprising to discover that HFs played the 
primary role in cases during the landing phase. Cited as 
one of the most critical flight phases, both unmanned and 
manned aircraft share this unfortunate quality (Huh and 
Shim 2010). Evidence of this is can be seen in the military 
RPAS sector with Williams (2004) reporting pilot landing 
errors as the clear leader in HF issues. Similar findings 
are also apparent in the air transport sector, with Boeing 
(2013) reporting that 47% of fatal accidents occur in the 
final approach and landing phases. A report by Huh and 
Shim (2010) attributes HF occurrences in RPAS operations 
to the complexities in situational awareness brought about 
by the remoteness of the pilot. Without data on the pilot 
in commands flight experience and time on type, it is hard 
to determine whether workload or insufficient training 
contributed to these events. 
lImItAtIons
There are 2 limitations of the results presented, the number 
of cases, and the limited information about the cases. The 
number of cases, spread over a 10-year period, prohibits an 
analysis based on changes over time for different classifications. 
That is, if we consider PoF (3 groups) and year of occurrence 
(10 groups), breaking the data down into both (30 groups) will 
result in some groups having “0” entries, which precludes the 
ability to conduct a χ2 test. With a larger sample size, such that 
no group had “0”, statistical analysis could be undertaken. The 
same is true if we consider any combination of classifications 
(PoF, ToF, OT, and OC).
The more pressing limitation is the lack of data in the case 
reports. That is, other useful information such as make and 
model of aircraft (even fixed wing/rotor wing type), operating/
takeoff mass and physical dimensions, or operation category 
are typically not included in publically available databases for 
civil RPAS occurrences. As such, the data is presented as holistic 
coverage of the civil RPAS sector, collecting as many reports 
as possible at this time.
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recommendAtIons
Based on the aforementioned limitations, the first 
recommendation to be made is that reporting of occurrences, 
particularly those concerning accidents and serious incidents, 
should be enforced by legislation applicable to the RPAS sector. 
Even though most civil aviation authorities have been revising 
their regulatory framework to incorporate this need, there is 
still a legislative gap to be addressed which precludes the 
effective reporting of all categories of RPAS, particularly 
small UAVs which regardless of their limited dimensions 
might still pose a serious risk to the operation of other 
aircraft and people on the ground. Concurrently, regulators 
should also invest in safety promotion actions tailored to the 
RPAS sector as a mean to foster operators to pro-actively 
report safety occurrences involving unmanned aircraft via 
the existing voluntary reporting systems irrespective of their 
perceived severity. 
As the current study was based on data sourced from 
publicly available databases fed by voluntary reporting systems, 
some of the data used herein was lacking details on the aircraft 
size and maximum takeoff weight, which prevented analysing 
the results taking into consideration the operation categories 
typically used in similar studies for manned aircraft, such as 
(Evans 2015). As such, if governments and the RPAS sector 
implement and adopt reporting systems for accidents and 
incidents, a more in depth analysis of the RPAS sector will be 
possible. This will help to improve safety in the RPAS industry, 
by developing a greater understanding and awareness of the 
specific nature of accidents and incidents in different RPAS 
operation categories, which is currently beyond the scope of 
available data.
concLusIon
With a growth of RPAS operation forecast, and the 
alleged incident involving a “drone” and a British Airways 
A320 at Heathrow Airport (Stevenson 2016), it is imperative 
to explore RPAS accidents and incidents. Furthermore, 
common factors were identified and studies such as this 
need to be continually undertaken in order to ensure the 
ongoing safety of the community and the sustainability of 
this thriving sector.  Globally, there has been a great deal 
of resources allocated by regulatory bodies to manage the 
exponential growth of the civil RPAS sector. However, in 
the area of accident and incident investigation and regulations 
in particular, it is possible to suggest that greater focus on data 
collection in the early stages of growth would have assisted 
greatly in developing a more targeted approach. Numerous 
studies have also been completed independently, identifying 
potential hazards and risks of these systems. In order to 
complement these proactive studies it is important that the 
reviews of past accidents and incidents are not forgotten 
as a vital source of data as they can provide an abundance 
of information used to validate these studies and identify 
lessons to be learnt.
This study aimed to identify common factors in RPAS 
accidents and incidents in civil aviation in order to assist in 
the process of mitigating these occurrences. This was done 
through posing the primary question “what are the common 
factors in RPAS accidents and incidents in civil aviation between 
2006 and 2015?”.
The analysis uncovered that the majority of occurrences 
were found to have involved SCFs with EPs dominating as 
primary CF. This led to the recognition that civil operated 
RPAS have distinct differences between other sectors of the 
industry such as GA and air transport. The result of this 
is that lessons learnt through post-accident and incident 
analysis in other sectors are less able to be transferred 
to the RPAS sector. Instead it was found that similarities 
were seen between the military and civil RPAS sectors, and 
hence RPAS is unique in the aviation industry. Currently, 
the industry trend to license RPAS operators will, in effect, 
focus on HFs issues. Specifically, the recommendation from 
this research is that regulators need to focus primarily 
on airworthiness requirements, which are still yet to be 
formalised for civil RPAS (Clothier et al. 2015).
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